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 1 Introduction
In a decentralized democratic political system, politicians are accountable to
their local electorates. In a centralized system, a politician is accountable to
the electorates of all jurisdictions he is governing. This di⁄erence triggers the
question of whether the level of accountability will be higher under a central-
ized or under a decentralized system. In general, an individual jurisdiction
is less likely to be pivotal in changing the outcome of centralized elections
in a multi-jurisdiction setting. This insight provides a strong argument that
decentralization is likely to increase accountability, as originally pointed out
by Seabright (1996) and also stressed by Persson and Tabellini (2000, chapter
9). The present analysis shows, however, that the contrary may actually be
the case, if random distortions of voters￿re-election decisions introduce the
possibility that accountable politicians are voted out of o¢ ce due to "bad
luck". With such random factors outside the incumbent politician￿ s control,
which introduce uncertainty into voters￿re-election decisions, accountability
can be higher under a centralized regime, at least as long as the random
factors are relatively unimportant. Examples of such random factors are
natural or economic events outside the control and the responsibility of the
incumbent politician, such as the weather during the incumbent￿ s term of
o¢ ce, the weather on election day, exogenous economic shocks, etc.
Recent empirical evidence supports the importance of random distortions
for voters￿re-election decisions. Achen and Bartels (2004) provide evidence
for the US that random events, such diverse as shark attacks, draughts and
￿ oods, and ￿ u prevalence, had a negative impact on the re-election per-
formance of incumbent politicians. Healy (2008) also ￿nds that extreme
weather events, such as insu¢ cient and excess rainfall, reduce the re-election
probability of incumbent politicians in the US. Similarly, Cole et al. (2008)
show that incumbent parties running for re-election in India get punished for
bad weather. Finally, Wolfers (2006) ￿nds that incumbent governors in the
2US are rewarded or punished for economic events outside their control. For
example, higher oil prices increase incumbents￿re-election probabilities in oil-
producing states, whereas they reduce incumbents￿re-election probabilities
in rust-belt states.
The present analysis uses a simple framework of retrospective voting.
Election and re-election of politicians is considered as a repeated game with
the possibility of tacit collusion and credible trigger strategies that retrospec-
tively punish politicians who do not behave accountably.1 Moreover, in line
with the empirical evidence, an additional factor to this relationship between
the electorate and the politician is added: bad luck. Thus, random factors
are allowed to play a major role for the re-election chances of an incumbent
politician, even if he has performed well. These random factors generate
a possibly small, but positive, probability that accountable politicians will
not be re-elected. This reduces the maximum accountability of politicians
that can be sustained, since the exogenous threat of being voted out of o¢ ce
makes misbehaving more attractive. To induce accountable behavior, higher
rents need to be left to accountable politicians.
This insight is then used to ask how the degree of decentralization a⁄ects
accountability. The analysis shows that a government that makes decisions
for many regions and needs to be re-elected by a majority of regions can be
induced to perform better and behave more in the interest of its constituency
than separate, independent governments of many regions, provided that the
probability of bad luck is su¢ ciently small. The intuition for this result is
as follows. Each jurisdiction is less likely to be pivotal for re-election under
the centralized regime than under the decentralized regime. Because each
region has a lower impact on the overall re-election, distorted re-election in
one particular region is less likely to cause a well-performing incumbent to
be voted out of o¢ ce. If the exogenous factors are relatively unimportant,
1There is considerable empirical evidence on the role of retrospective voting, see, for
instance, Norpoth (1996), Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000) and Kousser (2004).
3formation of a winning majority becomes more likely as the number of juris-
dictions increases. The pooling of random factors across jurisdictions in the
centralized system has the potential to reduce the threat of being voted out
of o¢ ce "by mistake". This increases the bene￿ts of staying in o¢ ce, gives
accordingly more leverage to voters, and increases the level of accountability.
The analysis also provides two arguments for uniform provision of pub-
lic goods in the centralized system. First, uniformity may be desirable for
reasons of interregional equity. In a centralized system, which allows for dis-
criminatory treatment across regions, and with a voting rule that conditions
on overall performance, accountability only depends on the aggregate level
of public good provision and the aggregate bene￿ts that need to be left to
the politician to avoid the complete diversion of public funds. Accordingly,
accountability depends not on the regional distribution of the public goods
an incumbent chooses to provide to the population. Thus, some regions may
end up with a lower provision level than under decentralization. Second, as
the analysis reveals, if regions condition their voting behavior only on the
provision level in their own region, average accountability is typically re-
duced, since the incumbent may choose not to serve some regions while still
maintaining a good chance of re-election by relying only on the votes from
those regions the incumbent chooses to serve. A uniformity requirement pre-
cludes such options for the incumbent. It guarantees equal provision levels
across regions and can avoid reduced overall levels of accountability.
This study contributes to a growing literature which analyzes the implica-
tions of centralized and decentralized government structures for the conduct
of government. Important aspects for this relationship are bench-marking
and yardstick competition, see Besley and Case (1995) and Revelli and Tovmo
(2007), lobbying and rent-seeking, see W￿rneryd (1998) and Cheikbossian
(2008), state capture, see Bardhan and Mokherjee (2000), and the role of
￿scal equalization, see Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2008). Several studies
consider empirically the relationship between decentralization and economic
4performance, typically measured by economic growth, see, among others,
Davoudi and Zou (1998), and Thornton (2007), or the relationship between
decentralization and corruption, see Fisman and Gatti (2002), and Fan et al.
(2009).
Moreover, the analysis adds a theoretical perspective to the recent empir-
ical literature on the importance of random factors for election outcomes and
accountability discussed above (Achen and Bartels (2004), Cole et al. (2008),
Healy (2008), and Wolfers (2006)). As such, it builds on the literature on ret-
rospective voting and accountability by Austen-Smith and Banks (1989) and
Ferejohn (1986). However, these authors did not address the question of cen-
tralized versus decentralized electoral control or the possibility of randomly
distorted election choices, the novel aspects that drive my results. Wrede
(2006) uses a two period retrospective voting model and also shows that uni-
formity requirements in centralized systems can increase accountability. His
analysis, however, does not consider random factors, so his results are com-
plementary to mine. The di⁄erence in the underlying mechanisms is further
discussed in section 5. Hindricks and Lockwood (2005) study accountability
and decentralization with incentive and selection e⁄ects. My analysis only
considers incentive e⁄ects of elections and does not address selection.
Finally, the possibility that collective decisions can out-perform individual
decisions in an environment where choices are subject to error has been
formulated in the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT), see, for example, Ladha
(1993). My theoretical framework results in a situation where the CJT logic
can be fruitfully applied to analyze federal structures. Here, embedded in
a model of retrospective voting, it is used to address the role of federal
structures for accountability. To the best of my knowledge, the role that the
CJT can play in the analysis of federal structures has not yet been illustrated
in the literature.
The analysis proceeds as follows. The framework of in￿nitely repeated
interaction between politicians and the electorate and randomly distorted re-
5election choices is developed in section 2. It is applied to a fully decentralized
government in section 3, and to centralized government structures in sections
4 and 5. Section 4 studies uniform centralized policies, a restriction that is
lifted in section 5. Section 6 demonstrates the robustness of the main results
to several important extensions. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Framework
Consider a single political jurisdiction and let there be an in￿nite sequence of
periods, t = 0;1;2;::: . In each period t, a player is the incumbent politician
at the beginning of the period. This player has an exogenously given budget
that is normalized and equal to 1 in each period and allocates this budget
between two purposes. One purpose is useful from the perspective of the
voters and can be seen as a publicly provided good. The amount spend
on this good is gt 2 [0;1]. The other purpose can be thought of as simple
diversion of public revenue for goods and activities that the politician likes
and that do not bene￿t the voters at all.
Let there be one single voter in the region. In a given period t he has
to decide whether to re-elect the incumbent politician. If the politician is
re-elected in t, he becomes the incumbent in period t+1. If not, then a new
politician is chosen. The old politician disappears and receives an exogenous
payo⁄ in all future periods that is equal to 0. The new politician inherits all
information that the previous politician had and he has the same preferences.
He is chosen from a set of politicians who do not belong to the set of voters
and cannot make any payo⁄ relevant choice unless they have been elected.
The voter observes gt and knows all previous choices g0;:::;gt￿1 when voting
at t. Both the voter and any incumbent politician also know the election
choices and election outcomes in previous periods.
Voting outcomes are based on two components. The ￿rst component is
called election choice. Election choices in period t 2 f0;1;:::g are denoted et,
6with et 2 f0;1g and can be interpreted as referring to whether the voter plans
to re-elect (1), or not re-elect (0) an incumbent politician in period t. Further,
the re-election is disturbed by possible other factors. More precisely, let the
choice of et = 0 always lead to a change in o¢ ce and to the appointment
of a new politician. However, if the voter chooses et = 1, the e⁄ective
election outcome is ￿tet, where ￿t is a random variable with ￿t 2 f0;1g
and prob(￿t = 0) ￿ q; for all periods t. Intuitively, ￿t may re￿ ect the fact
that, with some probability, the election outcome is dominated by an issue
other than the politician￿ s public provision decision, where I assume that,
whether or not this other issue becomes relevant, is not under the control of
the active players in the game. Examples for this could be factors or events
such as the weather during the incumbent￿ s term of o¢ ce, the weather on
the election day, economic shocks outside the incumbents responsibility and
control, etc.2 For simplicity, ￿t is assumed to be stochastically independent
across all periods, and ￿t also becomes observable at the very end of period
t for the voter and the politician. The assumption of a one-sided distortion
is for simplicity only. Section 6 extends the results to situations of two-sided
noise, in which also an unaccountable politician may be be re-elected "by
mistake".
A pure strategy of the voter in period t is a sequence of mappings et+i :
Ht+i￿[0;1] ! f0;1g, where Ht+i is the set of possible histories ht+i at period
t + i, i = 0;1;:::, with a history described as ht = ((g0;:::;gt￿1);(e0;:::;et￿1);
2Di⁄erent regions, and thus the voting decisions of these regions￿voters, may be hit
by di⁄erent shocks. An example of this would be bad weather which may only hit certain
regions. Alternatively, a single event can a⁄ect regions di⁄erently or is perceived di⁄erently
in di⁄erent regions. For example, a negative sectoral demand shock will only negatively
a⁄ect those regions where this sector is important. Similarly, an exogenous increase in oil
prices that a⁄ects all jurisdictions can result in di⁄erent shocks to the voting decisions in
oil-producing or oil-importing states, as illustrated by the empirical evidence in Wolfers
(2006). Note that the nature of the shock is closely related to the corresponding correlation
structure in multi-jurisdiction settings, which is further discussed in section 6.
7(￿0;:::;￿t￿1)), and the interval [0;1] is the set of possible public good pro-
vision gt+i. Note that the history implicitly also tells what the sequence of
politicians is, and how many of them have been in o¢ ce for how long, and
recall that any new incumbent is identical with any other politician in all
respects except for the time period when elected into o¢ ce. The incumbent
at t also observed the history of public provisions, election outcomes and
random disturbances described by ht. A pure strategy for the incumbent is
a sequence of mappings gt+i : Ht+i ! [0;1] for i = 0;1;:::.
The payo⁄ for the voter depends only on the series of public good out-
comes, and the voter￿ s period payo⁄ is gt. Accordingly, the value of the






where ￿ is an exogenous and time invariant discount factor ￿ 2 (0;1). Simi-
larly, the payo⁄for the politician for a given in￿nite series of pairs of outcomes
(gt;et) equals the discounted sum of resources 1￿gt+i which he used for pur-
poses that are useful only to himself. Accordingly, for a politician who is in
power in period t, the present value of his overall payo⁄ is
￿t = (1 ￿ gt) + ￿(1 ￿ gt+1)pt + ￿
2(1 ￿ gt+2)ptpt+1 + :::,
where pt denotes the re-election probability in period t. In what follows and
throughout the paper, I only consider stationary equilibria in pure strategies
in the in￿nitely repeated game with complete information. Stationarity is
de￿ned here by the property that the equilibrium path of gt = g￿ is constant
over time. I focus on the class of equilibria in which the voter chooses a simple
trigger strategy which is characterized by the property that he punishes the
politician if gt 6= g￿ and always re-elects a politician in a period in which gt =
g￿. This is justi￿ed because these strategies are also maximum punishment
strategies. The following holds:
8Proposition 1 Any public good level g￿ ￿ (1￿q)￿ can be sustained as a sta-
tionary equilibrium choice of incumbent politicians in the voting-appropriation
game in which the voter applies a simple trigger strategy. In this class of equi-
libria, the politician is re-elected in each period with probability (1 ￿ q) and
a politician stays in o¢ ce for 1
q periods on average in such equilibria. The
equilibrium in this class that maximizes the voter￿ s payo⁄ has g￿ = (1 ￿ q)￿.
Proof. Consider the following candidate equilibrium. The voter follows
a simple trigger strategy: he re-elects the politician in period t; if and only if,
gt = g￿ ￿ (1￿q)￿, and does not re-elect the incumbent politician but appoints
a new politician in all other cases. Any incumbent politician always chooses
gt = g￿. The one stage deviation principle applies here.3 It is therefore
su¢ cient to con￿rm that this behavior is superior to one-stage deviations for
both players. Consider ￿rst the incumbent politician. If he deviates in period
t and chooses some gt 6= g￿, he receives a period payo⁄that is equal to 1￿gt.
However, he is not re-elected, and has a period payo⁄ of zero in all future
periods. Hence, the maximum the politician can obtain by deviating from
g￿ in period t is obtained for a choice 1 ￿ gt = 1. A necessary and su¢ cient
condition for optimality of non-deviation therefore is





i(1 ￿ g) (2)
and this can be transformed into g ￿ (1 ￿ q)￿.
Consider now one stage deviations for the voter in period t. Given the as-
sumed equilibrium play in periods t+i, the voter is fully indi⁄erent whether to
re-elect the politician in period t or to appoint another politician, regardless
of the observed gt. Accordingly, a deviation from the candidate equilibrium
3This principle applies, since the game is an in￿nite horizon game with observed actions
in which future payo⁄s are discounted and per-period payo⁄s are bounded, cf. Fudenberg
and Tirole (1993, p.108-110).
9choice in period t is not pro￿table for the voter. Together with the optimal-
ity of gt = g￿ for the politician, this shows that the candidate equilibrium is
indeed an equilibrium.
Condition (2) also shows that g￿ = (1 ￿ q)￿ determines the smallest
amount repeatedly appropriated by the incumbent in this class of equilibria.
The equilibrium re-election probability (1 ￿ q) follows from the equilibrium
strategies, and the average duration a politician in o¢ ce is obtained using
the equilibrium election strategies as 1 + (1 ￿ q) + (1 ￿ q)2 + ::: = 1
q.
Proposition 1 characterizes a natural class of equilibria that relates closely
to simple trigger-strategy equilibria in games of price wars, such as in Green
and Porter (1984). Politicians are not re-elected in the equilibrium for reasons
of exogenous noise, despite the fact that the player who is punished does not
deviate from the stationary collusive action. The risk of "being punished"
without having deviated from the collusive equilibrium action reduces the
payo⁄ for both the politician and the voter. The equilibrium amount of
resources allocated to public provision of potentially useful goods is smaller
than in the absence of the possibility of a negative disturbance of the election
outcome, ￿t = 0. Hence, the risk of ￿t = 0 reduces accountability in the
equilibrium. This is evident from
@g￿
@q
= ￿￿ < 0. (3)
3 Fully decentralized governance
Consider ￿rst a country that is fully decentralized. It consists of n indepen-
dent regions j. In each region, the governance structure has the format that
has just been described, with a given period budget of size 1, one incumbent
politician in each period who chooses gjt 2 [0;1] in period t, one voter who
chooses ejt in period t, and a random disturbance of the election outcome.
Assume that the random disturbance factors ￿jt that transform ejt into the
10election outcome ￿jtejt are stochastically independent not only across peri-
ods, but also across regions.4 Applying Proposition 1 to this structure gives:
Proposition 2 Maximum accountability in the fully decentralized country in
a stationary equilibrium with simple trigger strategies by voters is described
by gjt = g￿ = ￿(1 ￿ q):The average number of periods in which a politician
stays in o¢ ce is 1=q.
Note that many of my assumptions about full decentralization closely cor-
respond to Oates￿(1972) and Tiebout￿ s (1956) ideas about ￿scal federalism.
The correspondence principle applies: the tax revenue is generated within a
region and expended for purposes that only bene￿t the citizens in this region,
and there are no interregional ￿scal externalities in terms of taxes or public
goods. Also, the decision maker is elected by the constituency in this region.
Further, the single-voter assumption is for simplicity and may be seen as
capturing a regional structure with a homogenous constituency which may
be the result of self-selection into homogenous regions, or the outcome of a
suitable de￿nition of regions. An extension of the analysis to a situation with
multiple voters is discussed in section 6.
4 Centralized governance with uniform pro-
vision
Consider now a country in which the n regions are governed by one single
politician who is the incumbent of a centralized government who is re-elected
4This assumption is mainly for clarity of exposition. Given that the random factors
may depict shocks such diverse as the region￿ s exposure to random sectoral demand or
price shocks, bad weather during the incumbent￿ s term of o¢ ce, the weather on election
day, political scandals based on things that happened before the incumbent￿ s term of
o¢ ce, etc., the independence assumption may be more or less accurate, depending on the
actual nature of the shocks. Section 6 discusses how the results are a⁄ected if shocks are
correlated between regions.
11by voters from all regions. Assume that there is one voter/vote from each
region. The intuitive meaning of this assumption is that we consider regions
that are homogenous inside, however, where there is heterogeneity between
regions.5 To avoid discussion of ties, let n be an uneven number of regions.
The central politician must allocate a budget of size n in each period. The
politician chooses a uniform gjt for all regions, so that gjt = gkt ￿ gt holds
for all j;k = 1;:::;n. Imposing uniformity of public provision resembles the
classic assumption made by Oates (1972). The provision decision is followed
by the choice of ejt in each region. Depending on this choice and the outcomes
of ￿jt, the election outcome from region j is ejt￿jt.
As there are n voters, one in each region, with centralized provision,
the history at period t when the incumbent politician makes his decision is
ht = ((g0;g1;:::gt￿1);(e0;e1;:::et￿1);(￿0;￿1;:::￿t￿1)), where e￿ denotes a vec-
tor (e1￿;:::en￿); with ￿ = 0;1;2;:::;t￿1; and ￿￿ denotes a vector (￿1￿;:::￿n￿)
with ￿ = 0;1;2;:::;t￿1 . Accordingly, a strategy for the incumbent politician
in period t is a sequence of mappings gt+i : Ht+i ! [0;1], where Ht+i is the
set of all feasible histories in period t+i;i = 0;1;::: . Similarly, a strategy for
the voter in region j is a sequence of mappings ejt+i : Ht+i ￿ [0;1] ! f0;1g.






The payo⁄ of the incumbent in the centralized country with uniformity is
￿t = n[(1 ￿ gt) + ￿(1 ￿ gt+1)pt + ￿
2(1 ￿ gt+2)ptpt+1 + :::]:
The politician who governs the whole country is re-elected in period t if
5The assumption may correspond more or less adequately to actual centralized govern-
ment and its (re-)election. For the US presidency elections, the correspondence may be
quite close, as the system turns all votes from a state into a single vote either for one or
the other candidate.







Now, the main proposition on the centralized regime with uniformity is:
Proposition 3 Any public provision g￿ can be sustained as a stationary














is ful￿lled. In this class of equilibria, the incumbent politician is re-elected







(1 ￿ q)n￿kqk. Maximum public
provision that can be sustained in such an equilibrium is higher (lower) than
public provision in the fully decentralized case if and only if q < (>)1
2.














For all regions j, the voter in region j chooses ejt = 1 if gjt = g￿ and ejt = 0
otherwise. Again, the one-stage deviation principle applies and I therefore
consider one stage deviations. For the politician, any deviation reduces his
re-election probability to zero. The deviation that maximizes his payo⁄ is























13Turn to the voter of region j. If the provision level is gjt = g￿ in all regions,
the candidate equilibrium choice is ejt = 1. Deviating from this choice may
still re-elect the same politician to the central government, or may elect a
di⁄erent politician into o¢ ce but will not increase the voter￿ s payo⁄. Sim-
ilarly, if gkt 6= g￿ in at least one region k, the candidate equilibrium action
is ejt = 0 for all voters in all regions. Again, deviating will not change
the voter￿ s payo⁄. This shows that the candidate equilibrium is, indeed, an
equilibrium.
The maximum sustainable public provision in this stationary equilibrium











k > 1 ￿ q: (7)
This will be ful￿lled if and only if q < 1=2, in line with the Condorcet Jury
Theorem (CJT), see Ladha (1993) for a proof.6
Proposition 3 shows that, in the uniformity regime, a simple symmetric
trigger strategy by all regions can sustain an equilibrium in which the politi-
cian￿ s accountability is higher than in the decentralized equilibrium. This
will be the case if random factors are relatively unimportant.
The intuition of the result is as follows. If random factors are relatively
unimportant in each single region, an accountable incumbent is more likely
to ￿nd support by a majority of regions in the centralized regime. The
re-election uncertainty reduces in the aggregate. This lowers the probabil-
6The CJT applies to a binary decision under uncertainty. It compares the outcome of an
individual decision, where the correct alternative is chosen with some probability p, with
the outcome of a group decision, with the individual probabilities of the group members
to choose correctly also being equal to p. It states that, if the individual probability of
each individual to choose correctly is larger than one half, (i) the majority decision of a
group of such individuals will choose the correct decision with a higher probability than
the individual. Moreover, (ii) the probability to choose correctly is increasing in group
size and, (iii) asymptotically approaches one as n ! 1; cf. Ladha (1993).
14ity that an accountable incumbent loses o¢ ce in the future, and therefore,
politicians can be made accountable with a lower fraction of private bene￿ts
in each term. Voters have more leverage to control politicians since holding
holding o¢ ce becomes more valuable for an incumbent in the centralized
system.7 Note that this is not a scale e⁄ect: the result does not depend on
the total amount of funds that are at the politician￿ s disposal in each given
period.
The increase in the re-election probability under centralization may be
regarded as a speci￿c application of the CJT. The comparison of centralized
with decentralized structures results in a situation where the CJT can be
fruitfully applied, and, embedded in a model of retrospective voting, can be
used to address the question of optimal federal structures for accountability.
As a corollary, the following comparative static result also holds:
Proposition 4 If q < 1
2 then the maximum g￿ increases in the number of
regions, and if q > 1
2 then g￿ decreases in the number of regions.
Proof. Accountability monotonously increases in the probability of win-
ning. However, for q < 1=2 Ladha (1993) shows that the re-election proba-
bility is increasing in n.
Intuitively, as the number of regions increases, it becomes easier to form a
majority combination of regions that are not a⁄ected by the potential random
distortion of the re-election decision, if the probability of such a distortion is
7In the context of the real world examples, the result implies that, if bad weather or
adverse regional economic shocks negatively a⁄ect an incumbent￿ s re-election, an account-
able incumbent is more likely to be recon￿rmed in nationwide elections than in regional
elections. Under centralization, his re-election probability increases since he is more likely
to secure the necessary majority of votes from those regions that are not a⁄ected by bad
weather or adverse economic shocks. Because the threat of losing o¢ ce due to bad weather
or adverse economic shocks is reduced, lower per-period bene￿ts are necessary to induce
accountability.
15low. If it is high, it becomes less likely that such a majority will be formed
as the number of regions increases.
One could think of many more complex strategies applied by voters to
further increase the accountability of the incumbent politician, since credible
threats that imply stronger punishment can, generally, sustain higher levels
of accountability. However, this is not necessary. The most the incumbent
can hurt the electorate is to provide no public goods at all and then be
replaced. On the other hand, there is no stronger punishment for voters
than to send the politician home. Thus, the considered Nash threats already
have the maximum possible punishment and, hence, no other credible threat
exists that could increase accountability.
5 Centralized system with non-uniform pro-
vision
Consider now the centralized discriminatory regime: the incumbent in pe-
riod t receives a budget of size n and can choose gt = (g1t;g2t;:::;gnt)
with gjt 2 [0;n] for all j = 1;2;:::n, and ￿n
j=1gjt ￿ n, for all periods
t. Note that this allows the central incumbent to increase the provision
level in individual regions above unity. The history of the game at pe-
riod t when the incumbent politician makes the provision decision is ht =
((g0;g1;:::gt￿1);(e0;e1;:::et￿1);(￿0;￿1;:::￿t￿1)), where g￿ = (g1￿;g2￿;:::gn￿),
e￿ = (e1￿;e2￿;:::en￿), and ￿￿ = (￿1￿;￿2￿;:::￿n￿), for ￿ = 0;1;:::t ￿ 1. The




(1 ￿ gjt) + ￿pt
n X
j=1




(1 ￿ gjt+2) + ::::
A strategy for the politician is a sequence of mappings gt+i : Ht+i ! ￿n;￿n = n
(g1;g2;:::;gn)
￿ ￿ ￿gj 2 [0;n];
Pn
j=1 gj ￿ n
o
. A strategy for the voter in region
j is a sequence of mappings ejt+i : Ht+i ￿ ￿n ! f0;1g. Consider again the
16maximum accountability that can be achieved in a stationary equilibrium in
pure strategies:
Proposition 5 Any public provision g = (g1;g2;:::gn) can be sustained as a






















(1￿q)n￿iqi, and maximum public provision
Pn
j=1 g￿
j is higher (lower) than public provision in the fully decentralized case
if q < (>)1
2.
Proof. Consider the following candidate equilibrium. The central politi-




















and ejt = 0 otherwise. Again, the one-stage deviation principle applies. For
the politician, any deviation in period t reduces his re-election probability to
zero. The deviation that maximizes his payo⁄ is ￿n
j=1git = 0. This choice







where ￿(n) is again given by (6). Comparing the numerator of (9) with (5)
shows that ng￿ is simply replaced by ￿n
j=1g￿
j. Also, (9) implies (8).
Turn to the voter of region j. If the overall provision is described by
￿n
j=1g￿
j, the candidate equilibrium choice is ejt = 1. Deviating from this
choice may still re-elect the same politician to the central government, or
17may elect a di⁄erent politician into o¢ ce. But this deviation does not change
the voter￿ s payo⁄. Similarly, if ￿n
j=1gjt 6= ￿n
j=1g￿
j, the candidate equilibrium
action is to vote ejt = 0 for all voters in all regions. Again, deviating will
not change the payo⁄. This shows that the candidate equilibrium is, indeed,
an equilibrium.
Parallel to the argument in the proof of proposition 3, one can show that
aggregate public provision that can be sustained in this stationary equilib-
rium is higher than in the decentralized equilibrium if q < 1=2.
The proof of Proposition 5 follows lines parallel to the proof of Proposition
3. The voters in region j know the full history of the game, and not only
the public provision in their own region, and their trigger strategy depends
on the provision that takes place in all regions. This makes the voters in the
discriminatory regime as powerful as in the uniformity regime and yields the
same amount of accountability. In particular, the same uniform stationary
equilibrium that maximizes accountability in the uniformity regime remains
sustainable in the discriminatory regime. The strategies of regions depend
on the full set of public provisions that take place in all regions, and in
the equilibrium for which the total sum of public provisions is largest, this
total sum is the same in both the uniformity and the discriminatory regimes.
It is not feasible for the incumbent politician to increase the sum that he
can appropriate over and above n ￿ ￿n
j=1g￿
j, for instance, by selecting only
some subset of regions and basing his re-election on preferential treatment of
these regions. Note also that Proposition 5 does not state that g￿
j is uniform
in the equilibrium with maximum accountability. Maximum accountability
is an aggregate measure, and may go along with uneven public provisions
across regions. A constitutional uniformity requirement could therefore well
be based on considerations of interregional equity.
The assumption that the voter of region j uses a strategy that depends
not only on the public provision experienced in region j but also on the pub-
lic provision in all other regions may be natural in the uniformity regime, as
18the provisions are identical in all regions by construction. It is a stronger
assumption in the context of the discriminatory regime. Under discrimina-
tion, a voter in California may condition his re-election decision on the policy
outcome in California and not on the outcome in other states, and the in-
centives for central policy-making are likely to be substantially altered. It is
therefore important to assess how a weaker assumption on voters re-election
behaviour may reduce the maximum accountability that can be obtained by
in￿nitely repeated interaction. In my analysis I focus on the natural case
in which the voter in each region can condition his own voting decision on
the history of provisions in his region only, and I sustain the assumption
of complete information.8 Thus, the California voter conditions his choice
on the California policy outcome, the Vermont voter on the Vermont policy
outcome, etc. Technically, this results in the additional restriction on voters￿
strategies being mappings ejt+i : H
t+i
j ￿ [0;n] ! f0;1g; i = 0;1;..., that
are constant with respect to all components of h
t+i
j except for the values of
gj0;gj1;:::gjt+i.
Suppose a stationary equilibrium exists and is characterized by a provision
vector gt = g. Suppose that the voter in each region applies the following
strategy: ejt = 1 if gjt = gj, and ejt = 0 otherwise. Assume that the regions
are numbered in a way such that 0 ￿ g1 ￿ g2 ￿ ::: ￿ gn. What would
be the best stationary reply for an incumbent in period 0? Note, ￿rst, that
any vector (^ g1;::::; ^ gn) with components ^ gj = 2 f0;gjg is suboptimal, as it is
dominated by replacing ^ gj with 0 in this vector. Next, note that any vector ^ g,
that has ^ gj = 0 and ^ gj+i = gj+i > 0, i = 1;:::;n ￿ j, unless gj = gj+1::: = gn
is suboptimal, as it is dominated by a vector that has ^ gj = gj and ^ gj+i = 0
and that is identical with ^ g along all other components. Further, any vector
that has a positive number of strictly positive components with this number
being smaller than n+1
2 is also suboptimal, as it is strictly dominated by
8Accounting for incomplete information yields a rather di⁄erent framework with type
dependent histories, Bayesian updating and belief formation.
19^ g = 0. In short, the optimal stationary reply to the stationary strategies of
the voters must be either ^ g = 0, or a vector of provisions that is positive only
in its n ￿ m ￿ (n + 1)=2 components and provides exactly ^ gj = gij in these
components. In the latter case, the re-election probability of the politician
depends on the choice of this vector, and is equal to











The incumbent￿ s optimal reply is a provision vector (g1;g2;:::;gn￿m;0;:::;0)
such that m is
m
DC(g) ￿ arg max
m2f0;1;:::;n￿1
2 g




1 ￿ ￿￿(n ￿ m)
:
We can now use this insight to show the following proposition:
Proposition 6 Let q < 1=2, and let ng￿ be the maximum provision that
can be sustained in a stationary equilibrium with uniform provision and un-
constrained trigger strategies. The maximum provision that can be sustained
as a stationary equilibrium with discriminatory provision and strategies that
condition only on current provision in the voter￿ s own region (short: DC-
equilibrium) is at most ng￿, and, for n su¢ ciently large, is smaller than
ng￿.
Proof. The ￿rst part of the proof follows from Proposition 5. Suppose
a higher value of total provision than ng￿ could be implemented. For this
stationary equilibrium to be (weakly) superior to a choice of gj = 0 for all
j = 1;:::;n, the re-election probability of the politician had to be higher than
in the equilibrium in Proposition 5, but this is incompatible with ejt = 1 for
all j and all t in the equilibrium in Proposition 5.
For the second part of the proposition note ￿rst that any DC-equilibrium











i that ful￿lls (11) for any given mDC.
Note that this maximum is equal to ng￿ for mDC = 0, and strictly smaller
for all mDC > 0, as ￿(n￿mDC) is strictly decreasing in mDC. It is therefore
su¢ cient to show that g = (g1;:::;gn) with
Pi=n￿m
i=1 gi = ng￿ and m = 0 is
not a DC-equilibrium if n is su¢ ciently large.
Suppose g = (g1;:::;gn) is a provision vector that can be sustained as a
DC-equilibrium with ￿
n￿mDC
j=1 gj = ng￿ and mDC = 0. Then, by appropriately
numbering of regions in ascending order of provisions, it holds that gn ￿ g￿.
Consider the incumbent politician who chooses between provisions g and





￿ ￿(n ￿ 1) ￿
n ￿ (n ￿ 1)g￿
1 ￿ ￿￿(n ￿ 1)
: (12)
The right-hand side in (12) is higher than ￿(n) if
g
￿ >
n￿[￿(n ￿ 1) ￿ ￿(n)]
[1 ￿ ￿￿(n) + n￿[￿(n) ￿ ￿(n ￿ 1)]]
.
Note that limn!1f￿(n ￿ 1)g = limn!1f￿(n)g = 1 and, hence,
lim
n!1f
n￿[￿(n ￿ 1) ￿ ￿(n)]
[1 ￿ ￿￿(n) + n￿[￿(n) ￿ ￿(n ￿ 1)]]
g = 0,
but, if q < 1=2, limn!1 g￿(n) = ￿ > 0, Accordingly, for su¢ ciently large n,
the incumbent politician prefers ￿ g to g.
Thus, for su¢ ciently large n, the aggregate level of accountability that
can be sustained in a symmetric equilibrium is lower in the discriminatory
provision equilibrium than in situations in which each region conditions its
strategy on the incumbent￿ s track record in all regions. Intuitively, since re-
gions only condition their behavior on their local provision levels, the regions
as a whole lose leverage against the incumbent. The incumbent, in turn, does
21not depend on all regions to build a nationwide majority, but can consider
dropping some regions altogether, and still ￿nd a majority of favorite votes
under this setting.
This ￿nding can be related to the result derived by Ferejohn (1986) on
the relationship between an incumbent politician and a non-homogenous elec-
torate and the results of Wrede (2006) who makes an argument in favor of
uniform provision in a federal system. Both authors ￿nd that the compe-
tition between multiple voters can result in a total loss of accountability,
which, applied to the context with homogenous regions, would even imply
zero provision levels for all regions. It is important to note, however, that the
underlying mechanism in their approaches is very di⁄erent. In my framework
the levels of gj or g which voters ￿nd acceptable or not are given from the
outset and are not the outcome of a bidding process between voters/regions.
The politician does not have the option of approaching the di⁄erent voters
and negotiating these levels. If the politician does have this option as in
Wrede (2006) and Ferejohn (1986), given that he needs only a simple major-
ity of votes, he can stage a competition between the voters and "buy" a given
number of votes m < n. As there are more voters than needed, Bertrand
competition can unfold and may result in very low levels of gj. Whether this
type of bargaining can take place is an empirical matter, and is not an option
in my framework. If this option is introduced, it gives a further reason for
lower accountability of centralized non-uniform governance structures. This
reason adds to, but is di⁄erent from, the reason concentrated on here.
Finally, one would like to compare accountability under the centralized
regime with strategies conditioned on regional provision histories to the de-
centralized regime of section 3. It follows directly from proposition 6 that
aggregate provision can be higher under the former regime than under de-
centralization, if all regions are being served. On the other hand, if the
incumbent ￿nds it optimal not to serve all regions it is easy to construct
examples in which aggregate accountability will be lower than under decen-
22tralization. Thus, in general it cannot be unambiguously determined which
of the two regimes will dominate the other in terms of aggregate account-
ability. The relative advantage of one regime over the other depends on the
given parameters and on the distribution of the gj across regions.9
To sum up the ranking of regimes, aggregate accountability is highest
under centralized provision with strategies that condition on the entire pro-
vision history across all regions. This holds for uniform and non-uniform
provision requirements. Provision levels are lower under decentralization and
centralized, non-uniform provision, if regions condition their voting behavior
on regional histories only, provided that the number of regions is su¢ ciently
large. The latter two regimes cannot be unambiguously ranked in general.
The analysis of this section provides a rational for introducing a unifor-
mity requirement. Under such requirement, the incumbent needs to serve all
regions equally and does not have the possibility to drop some regions com-
pletely in his provision decisions. A uniformity requirement also implies that
regions indirectly condition on the nationwide provision level, even if they
only condition their action only on the local provision level. In the situation
analyzed here, this will result in higher levels of accountability.
6 Extensions
The analysis has deliberately used a very simpli￿ed framework to bring out
the key mechanism at work. However, in order to be sure that the results
9Not serving certain regions is likely to occur if the gj are very unequal across regions.
In this case, it is likely to be optimal for the incumbent not to serve the high gj regions, and,
in this case, aggregate accountability is likely to be below the level under decentralization,
because average provision levels in the other regions will be low. On the other hand,
with n ! 1, and gj = g￿ for all j = 1;2;:::;n, for accountability to be higher under
decentralization requires nq < m. However, for q " 1=2 this would require m ￿ n=2 which
cannot be optimal. Thus, under this constellation, accountability can be lower under
decentralization.
23are valid more generally it is useful to consider modi￿cations to some of the
simplifying assumptions. For brevity and clarity, the discussion of possible
extensions centers around the comparison of the fully decentralized regime
with centralized regime with uniform provision. The most interesting exten-
sions are the possibility of two-sided noise to the election decision, multiple
voters within regions, and correlated shocks.
Two sided noise: The analysis considered the case in which a shock
occurs only to the decision not to re-elect an accountable politician. Assume
now that an accountable politician is re-elected with certainty, but that, with
probability lower than one half, there may be a shock to the decision not to
re-elect an unaccountable politician, such that an unaccountable politician
wins another term. This possibility makes unaccountability more attractive
for an incumbent since, with some probability, he will be re-elected despite
his unaccountable behavior. Accordingly, to induce accountability, larger
rents need to be left to accountable politicians. However, pooling the votes
from di⁄erent regions under the centralized regime will make it more unlikely
that an unaccountable politician will stay in o¢ ce. Thus, also in this case,
accountability will be higher under centralization. As a consequence, with
two sided noise, where accountable politicians may be voted out of o¢ ce by
mistake and unaccountable politicians may also be erroneously con￿rmed in
o¢ ce, and where the probability of these errors is relatively small, the argu-
ment in favor of centralized provision can be made a fortiori, since pooling
the votes reduces both sources of re-election uncertainty and thus increases
maximum sustainable accountability.
Multiple voters: The argument also extends to the case in which there
are multiple voters in each region. If we assume that the shocks to the
voting decision are uncorrelated across individuals within each region, and
again occur with a relatively low probability (smaller than one half), the
pooling of individual errors in the regional election, and the pooling of re-
gional errors in the nationwide election will both reduce the possibility that
24an accountable politician will be voted out of o¢ ce by mistake, and thus
both will increase accountability. Again centralized uniform provision will
result in higher accountability due to the additional reduction of the noise
through the additional nationwide pooling of votes from the regions. In such
a setting one may wonder what the relative e⁄ects on accountability of risk
pooling within the region and of risk pooling between the regions are, and
whether an optimal region size exists that maximizes accountability. The
results of Boland et al. (1989) imply that equilibrium re-election probability
for an accountable politician, and thus maximum sustainable public good
provision, will be highest in a situation where the votes are aggregated in a
single election, i.e. where regions consist of a single individual.
Correlation between voters￿election distortions: Another simpli-
fying assumption for the result so far has been that the disturbance ￿jt that
turns a positive re-election choice into the election outcome is idiosyncratic
to the region. This simpli￿cation was mainly chosen for clarity and sim-
plicity of exposition. It is natural to ask whether the results are robust to
changes in this assumption. For positively correlated shocks between regions
the general statistical results derived Boland et al. (1989) and Berg (1993)
imply that, given that the probability of an individually distorted election
choice is smaller that one half, the re-election probability for accountable
politicians will also be increased under centralization compared to the fully
decentralized setting, unless correlation is perfect. However, the higher the
positive correlation the smaller is the increase in the re-election probability
and the corresponding increase in sustainable public good provision relative
to the decentralized setting. On the other hand, with negative correlation
the positive e⁄ects of centralization on the re-election probability of account-
able politicians is even compounded, cf. Berg (1993).10 These results imply
10Note that the correlation of the shocks is not only related to the nature of the shocks
as remarked in footnote 3 but also to the heterogeneity of regions. The di⁄erences between
regions may be either exogenous, such as di⁄erences in the productive structure, which
25that the results on relative accountability under the centralized and decen-
tralized structures are qualitatively robust, but will quantitatively depend
on the nature of the correlation.
To understand better the scope and intuition of the main mechanism
increasing accountability consider a more general speci￿cation of the dis-
turbance ￿jt, that allows for nationwide as well as regional in￿ uences on
such a shock. In such a case, there is some, but not perfect, correlation
across regions. Let ￿tj ￿ 1 ￿ ￿t ￿ "tj + ￿t"tj, where ￿t 2 f0;1g, with
prob(￿t = 1) = v, represents the nationwide shock that is the same for all
regions, and "tj 2 f0;1g, with prob("tj = 1) = z, a local shock that is speci￿c
to a region and where these regional shocks "tl;"tk;k 6= l are uncorrelated,
and are also uncorrelated with ￿t. The situation analyzed above amounts
to the situation in which v = 0 and z = q. Alternatively, the situation of
perfectly correlated shocks across regions would result if there is only a na-
tionwide shock, but no regional shock, i.e. v > 0 and z = 0. In this situation,
there is no di⁄erence in maximum accountability between centralization and
decentralization.
However, consider the intermediate case in which v > 0 and z > 0. A
stationary equilibrium in the voting provision game exists in which the re-
election probability of an accountable politician is equal to (1 ￿ v)(1 ￿ z)
under decentalization. Under the centralized regime, the re-election proba-
bility is (1 ￿ v)￿(n), where now ￿(n) = prob(
Pn
j=1(1 ￿ "tj) ￿ n+1
2 ). From
this it is immediately clear that, by analogy to proposition (3), the re-election
probability is higher under the centralized regime as long as z < 1=2. Thus,
to induce the incumbent to behave accountable less resources need to be left
generates di⁄erent degrees of exposure to demand shocks to speci￿c sectors. Alternatively,
the interregional di⁄erences may be the outcome of a sorting process. Starting with
Tiebout (1956), many scholars have pointed at the importance of sorting in federal systems,
i.e. the possibility that people select themselves into di⁄erent jurisdictions according
to their preferences, values, income, age, etc. While such sorting is never perfect the
di⁄erences between regions may a⁄ect the nature of the correlation structure.
26to the incumbent. In line with the general results by Boland et al. (1989) and
Berg (1993), the overall scope for increasing accountability is smaller if na-
tionwide shocks are relatively more important and regional voting outcomes
more closely correlated.
Returning to real world examples, this extension shows that the poten-
tial for increasing accountability under centralization is higher for economic
shocks that systematically a⁄ect regions di⁄erently, such as oil price ￿ uctu-
ations or other sectoral demand shocks. If the election choice is distorted
by random shocks, such as poltical scandals based on true or faked evidence,
which are likely to have a similar e⁄ect nationwide, unless regional sorting has
resulted in di⁄erent moral values that would result in a di⁄erent reaction to
the scandal, centralization provides less scope for increasing accountability.
7 Conclusion
Random factors, such as the weather or exogenous economic shocks, a⁄ect
the re-election of incumbent politicians. The possibility that accountable
politicians are voted out of o⁄￿ce "by mistake" reduces the accountability
of incumbent politicians. However, the e⁄ects of such random factors on the
re-election outcome interact critically with the architecture of government.
Centralized political systems can provide a higher level of accountability if
the random distortions are not dominating the re-election. The pooling of
potentially distorted votes in the centralized system increases the likelihood
that accountable politicians are actually rewarded with an additional term
in o¢ ce and the politicians￿rents per term in o¢ ce can be reduced.
The analysis also provides arguments for uniform provision levels in cen-
tralized systems. First, if voters in each region base their retrospective voting
on the provision level in all regions, the maximum level of public good pro-
vision that can be sustained is de￿ned only in the aggregate, with potential
distributional imbalances in the equilibrium. Thus, there is a good reason
27for uniform distribution for reasons of interregional equity. Second, if voters
in each region base their retrospective voting only on the level of public good
provision in their own region, the discriminatory regime can reduce account-
ability. Of course, in my setting, all regions were identical and there are
therefore no inherent costs of uniform treatment of all regions. In reality, re-
gions are likely to be asymmetric and therefore reasons may exist for having
di⁄erentiated policies towards them. If such bene￿ts are strong, decentral-
ized systems may be preferable to avoid the potential negative e⁄ects of a
centralized discriminatory regime on accountability.
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